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Non-Student Co-Signers and Section
523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code
Melissa A. Hallt
When Congress undertook its reform of the Bankruptcy Code
in 1978, there was sharp debate on the topic of student loans.
Armed with statistics showing that students were defaulting on
their educational debts with alarming frequency, Congress ex-
cepted these loans from its otherwise liberal "fresh start" policy of
allowing bankrupt debtors to discharge nearly all of their obliga-
tions.1 Accordingly, under section 523(a)(8), students who take out
educational loans are not permitted to discharge them in bank-
ruptcy proceedings during the first five years of repayment.
The statute defines an "educational loan" as any
educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured
or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under
any program funded in whole or in part by a governmen-
tal unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to
repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholar-
ship or stipend.2
t B.A. 1989, Duke University; J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Chicago.
Although the "fresh start" policy dominates the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has cre-
ated specific discharge exceptions to it. These discharge exceptions attempt to deter debtors
from discharging particular liabilities for public policy reasons. For example, in addition to
educational loans, § 523 also excepts the following debts from bankruptcy discharge: debts
for taxes or customs duty; debts for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or
refinancing of credit obtained by false pretenses; debts not scheduled or listed under
§ 521(1) which requires debtors to file a creditor list and schedules of assets-liabilities and
current income-expenditures; debts for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary ca-
pacity, embezzlement or larceny; debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to
another entity or to the property of another entity; debts arising from a judgment or con-
sent decree entered in court against the debtor; or debts previously waived or denied dis-
charge. See Bankruptcy Code 11 USCA § 523 (1979 and 1991 Supp).
1 11 USCA § 523(a)(8). See also 136 Cong Rec H12389 (Oct 27, 1990) (remarks of Rep.
Brooks). The 1990 amendment expanded "the nondischargeability of student loans to debts
which are similar in nature to student loans." Representative Brooks also noted that
§ 523(a)(8) does not supersede loan programs which have their own discharge provisions.
Previously, the statute excepted "an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a
governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmen-
tal unit or a nonprofit institution of higher education." 11 USCA § 523(a)(8), revised by Pub
L No 101-581, § 2(a), 104 Stat 2865 (Nov 15, 1990).
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Students who show "undue hardship" are exempted from this pro-
vision and permitted to discharge their loans.3 Congress apparently
thought that making these loans non-dischargeable would safe-
guard the pool of educational loan funds, the solvency of which
depends upon student repayment.
Student loan practices have changed in the past decade. In
particular, educational lenders frequently require student borrow-
ers to find a co-signer,' who is often a spouse or a parent. Because
co-signers promise to repay the debt if the student defaults, lend-
ers perceive a decreased likelihood that these loans will sour. How-
ever, when Congress 'revised the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, stu-
dents did not need a co-signer to obtain an educational loan.6
11 USCA § 523(a)(8)(B). Debtors who declare bankruptcy under Chapter 7 give up
their assets, but have full rights to their future earnings. Discharge of educational loans is
prohibited in Chapter 7 proceedings. Thus, under § 523(a)(8), a Chapter 7 debtor must pay
back an educational loan in full unless the court discharges the debt, because payment of
the debt would be an "undue hardship" for the debtor or his dependents. 11 USCA
§ 523(a)(8)(B).
Most educational loans excepted from discharge under Chapter 7 may be discharged
under Chapter 13. 11 USC § 1328(a),(c); Lawrence King, ed. 5 Collier on Bankruptcy,
§ 1328.01(1)(c) (Times Mirror Books, 15th ed 1990). Although the two chapters treat educa-
tional loan discharge inconsistently, this result is typical of the difference between Chapters
7 and 13.
Debtors may retain their assets in Chapter 13 proceedings, but must file a plan to repay
their debts that requires them to give up part of their future income. 11 USCA §§ 1321,
1322, 1325. The broader discharge provisions in Chapter 13 provide an incentive for debtors
to fulfill their obligations under their plan. 11 USCA § 1328. To qualify for Chapter 13
treatment, an individual debtor must owe less than $100,000 in unsecured debts and less
than $350,000 in secured debts. Thus, a Chapter 13 debtor may only pay back part of his
educational loan. For a discussion of this inconsistent treatment of educational loans in the
Bankruptcy Code, see Paula Aiello and Eric Behrens, Student Loans, Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code, and the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 13 J Coil & Univ L 1 (1986);
Ted D. Ayres and Diane R. Sagner, The Bankruptcy Reform Act and Student Loans: Un-
raveling New Knots, 9 J Coll & Univ L 361 (1982-83); and Joel Kauffman and Robert
Schupp, Discharge of Student Loans Under Chapter 13 (Wage Earner Plans) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 93 Coin L J 101 (1988).
' Some cases, such as In re Bawden, 55 Bankr 459 (M D Ala 1985) and In re Boylen, 29
Bankr 924 (N D Ohio 1983), use the terms co-signer, guarantor, or co-maker interchangea-
bly. These terms, however, have different meanings that should be distinguished. This Com-
ment will refer to these terms according to the definitions below:
A co-signer assumes liability for a loan only if the primary obligor (student) defaults.
The federal or state government or an agency funded by the government acts as a guar-
antor. A guarantor promises to repay the lending institution if the student defaults on the
loan and the lending institution is unable to collect from the co-signer.
Co-makers assume equal liability for the debt, unlike co-signers who are secondarily
liable for the debt. A lending institution has no obligation to attempt to collect from one co-
maker before the other.
' Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, HR Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 1, 133
(1977), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5963, 6094.
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Section 523(a)(8) is silent on the topic of co-signers. There is
no evidence that Congress considered the issue in 1978, nor has it
addressed the problem since then. The issue has, however, arisen
in bankruptcy court, where co-signers have asked with uneven suc-
cess to be relieved of their obligations. Of those courts that have
considered the issue directly, a majority has held that because sec-
tion 523(a)(8) was created solely to prevent students from dis-
charging their educational debts through bankruptcy, non-students
may discharge these education loans.' The remaining courts have
applied the language of the section literally, holding that co-signers
may not discharge educational loans.7 Yet, the question of co-
signer discharge remains unresolved in most bankruptcy districts.8
This Comment advocates interpreting section 523(a)(8) to per-
mit a co-signer of an educational loan to discharge the debt in
bankruptcy. This result is most consistent with the "fresh start"9
policy of the Bankruptcy Code, which is designed to allow debtors
to discharge their existing debts, to relieve them from prior finan-
cial obligations, and to prevent harm to debtors that might other-
wise result from the negative financial consequences of declaring
bankruptcy.10 Congress's clear intent-to preserve the pool of edu-
cational funds with the least possible damage to the "fresh start"
policy-advises against applying section 523(a)(8) to non-student
co-signers.
' See In re Bawden, 55 Bankr at 461; In re Behr, 80 Bankr 124 (N D Iowa 1987); In re
Boylen, 29 Bankr at 924; In re Meier, 85 Bankr 805, 806 (W D Wis 1986); In re Washington,
41 Bankr 211 (E D Va 1984); In re Zobel, 80 Bankr 950 (N D Iowa 1986).
See Matter of Barth, 86 Bankr 146 (W D Wis 1988); In re Hammarstrom, 95 Bankr
160 (N D Cal 1989); In re Reid, 39 Bankr 24, 26 (E D Tenn 1984); Matter of Selmonosky, 93
Bankr 785 (N D Ga 1988). Although In re Feenstra, 51 Bankr 107 (W D NY 1985), techni-
cally involved a co-signer, the court interpreted § 523(a)(8) to prohibit non-students from
discharging educational loans. This reasoning has influenced other courts' interpretation of
this statute. See notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
8 Only ten of the 92 federal bankruptcy courts have decided this issue. See Matter of
Barth, 86 Bankr at 146; In re Bawden, 55 Bankr at 461; In re Behr, 80 Bankr at 124; In re
Boylen, 29 Bankr at 924; In re Hammarstrom, 95 Bankr at 160; In re Meier, 85 Bankr at
806; In re Reid, 39 Bankr at 26; Matter of Selmonosky, 93 Bankr at 785; In re Washington,
41 Bankr at 211; In re Zobel, 80 Bankr at 950.
11 USCA §§ 101 et seq (1979 and 1991 Supp).
10 Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv L Rev
1393 (1985). Professor Jackson acknowledges that these "protections are described in sec-
tions 524 and 525 of the Bankruptcy Code, and include an injunction against any act to
collect on the debt as well as protections against actions taken by governmental units or
employees on account of the discharge." Id at 1393 and n 2 (citation omitted). Any contin-
gent liability which is not discharged during bankruptcy and eventually becomes non-con-
tingent could cause financial harm to a debtor, forcing him to declare bankruptcy again. If
all debts are discharged at one time, the debtor can start over without the possibility of any
of his past debts reappearing.
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Although a literal interpretation of section 523(a)(8) prevents
co-signers from discharging obligations on educational loans, this
Comment suggests that such a result is inconsistent with the pur-
pose of the statute. The infrequency and the small monetary im-
pact of these discharges refute the argument that permitting dis-
charge endangers educational loan funds." Additionally, courts
who read the statute literally sometimes permit co-signer discharge
anyway, further muddling interpretation of section 523(a)(8).
Part I of this Comment describes the types of educational
loans to which section 523(a)(8) applies and the obligations of co-
signers under each. Part II recounts the legislative history of sec-
tion 523(a)(8). Part III summarizes the bankruptcy cases that have
interpreted this statute. Part IV analyzes these cases and argues
that non-student co-signers should be permitted to discharge edu-
cational loan obligations.
I. LIABILITIES ASSUMED BY Co-SIGNERS OF EDUCATIONAL LOANS
Congress has established a number of educational loan pro-
grams that make funds available to students who might otherwise
have difficulty financing their education. Some of the programs are
entirely need-based, while others simply ease student access to
loan funds. Generally, students do not have to begin repaying their
loans until they are out of school.
Section 523(a)(8) primarily affects loans made under two pro-
grams. 2 First, the National Direct Student Loan ("NDSL") pro-
gram 3 directly funds colleges and universities that agree to con-
tribute in proportion to the federal assistance made available to
them.1 ' Through the NDSL program, institutions provide financial
aid directly to students who demonstrate financial need. Also re-
ferred to as Perkins Loans, these loans can only be used for tuition
costs. No co-signer is required for a student to obtain this type of
loan.
Second, under the Guaranteed Student Loan ("GSL") pro-
gram, 15 created by the Higher Education Act of 1965,16 government
" See notes 18 and 81 and accompanying texts.
"S Due to amendments enacted November 15, 1990, § 523(a)(8) has been expanded to
include any "obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or
stipend." 11 USCA § 523(a)(8). See also note 2 and accompanying text.
" 20 USC §§ 1087aa-ii (1988).
" Recent Development, "Good Faith" and the Discharge of Education Loans in Chap-
ter 13: Forging a Judicial Consensus, 38 Vand L Rev 1087, 1090 (1985). Educational institu-
tions must contribute $1 for every $9 governmental contribution. Id.
"' 20 USC §§ 1071 et seq (1988).
16 20 USC 99 1070 et seq (1988).
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guarantees encourage private lenders to make student loans. The
amount borrowed cannot exceed the difference between a student's
educational costs and any other financial aid that student may re-
ceive. 17 Unlike the NDSL program, which the government funds
directly, the Department of Education has only secondary obliga-
tions in the GSL program. Its guarantees become payable only
when students default on their loans.
The Treasury spends about $2 billion each year to repay de-
faulted student loans.18 And although both the NDSL and GSL
programs are covered under section 523(a)(8), only under the latter
does the problem of non-student co-signers arise.19
Co-signing requirements for student loans began appearing in
the 1980s. Although no data exist to explain this trend,20 the re-
quirement makes sense to both lenders and borrowers. Faced with
prospective student borrowers who have no collateral or credit rat-
ing, a lender, not surprisingly, is somewhat reluctant to make the
loan. Moreover, it is unlikely that impecunious students can afford
interest rates commensurate with the risk they present. When a
third person with an acceptable credit rating co-signs the loan, the
risk to the lender is greatly reduced. As a result, some lenders offer
lower interest rates on loans if third parties co-sign them.2
17 Id.
s Eric N. Berg, Crisis at Top Loan Insurer: A $1.5 Billion 'F', NY Times D1 (Aug 13,
1990).
1, Recent Development, 38 Vand L Rev at 1091-93 (cited in note 14). Two systems exist
to guarantee student loans. Under the state system, the state or a private agency operates as
a direct insurer of the loans, and the Department of Education ("DOE") acts as a secondary
guarantor. Id. On the federal level, the Federal Insured Student Loan ("FISL") programs,
the DOE guarantees student loans directly if the lender proves that they cannot obtain
insurance from a state or a private agency. Id.
Congress made educational loan funds available directly to the parents of a dependent
student in the form of "PLUS" loans. 20 USCA § 1087-2. Parents may borrow up to $4,000
annually for one student in any academic year, not to exceed $20,000 total for each student.
20 USCA § 1087-2(b)(1)-(2). Courts have explicitly ruled that a parent who obtains loans
under the PLUS program may not discharge the loan in bankruptcy. See, for example, In re
Reid, 39 Bankr 24; In re Hammarstrom, 95 Bankr 160; In re Hudak, 113 Bankr 923 (W D
Pa 1990).
10 One should note that the appearance of co-signing requirements cannot logically be
traced to 11 USCA § 523(a)(8), because the discharge exemption should make student bor-
rowers more likely to repay their loans.
Si A number of educational loans permit a student to receive a lower interest rate on
the loan guarantee fee if another person agrees to co-sign. For example, HEMAR Insurance
Corporation of America through Norwest Bank South Dakota offers the following terms on
their guarantee loan fees to business and law students through the Tuition Loan Program
("TLP") and Law Student Loan ("LSL") Program:
6 percent for loans which are co-signed and interest is paid.
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Some unwary third parties, however, co-sign educational loans
unnecessarily. Simply because some supplemental loans may be co-
signed22 does not mean that a third party should do so if the
lender does not require a co-signer or reduce the interest rate when
the loan is co-signed.2 3
Educational loan documents contain notices summarizing the
co-signer's financial obligations. The following is a typical co-signer
provision:
NOTICE TO ALL CO-SIGNERS OF THIS NOTE
You are being asked to guarantee this debt. Think
carefully before you do. If the borrower does not pay the
debt you will have to. Be sure you can afford to pay if
you have to, and that you want to accept this
responsibility.
You may have to pay up to the full amount of the
debt if the borrower does not pay. You may also have to
pay late fees or collection costs, which increase this
amount.
The Lender [bank] can collect this debt from you
without first trying to collect from the borrower. The
Lender [bank] can use the same collection methods
against you that can be used against the borrower, such
as suing you, garnishing your wages, etc. If this debt is
ever in default, that fact may become a part of your
credit record.
8.875 percent for loans which are not co-signed and interest is paid.
7.5 percent for loans which are co-signed and interest is capitalized.
7.5 percent at disbursement and 3.25 percent added at repayment for loans which
are not co-signed and interest is capitalized.
Professional Education Plan ("PEP")/The Education Resources Institute ("TERI") offers:
5 percent on guarantee fee with co-signer.
8 percent on guarantee fee without a co-signer.
Business Student Loan ("BSL") offers the following interest rates on loan guarantee fees:
6.5 percent for loans that are co-signed.
9.5 percent for loans that are not co-signed.
Although large private lending institutions provide these reduced rates for co-signed loans,
some local banks do not offer better terms on educational obligations if the loan is co-
signed. For further information, see loan documents available on file at the Legal Forum
office.
11 If two non-students (usually parents) sign a PLUS loan together, they are referred to
as co-makers. See note 4. As co-makers, they have equal primary liability for the debt. A
non-student who co-signs with a student is secondarily liable for the loan obligation.
I' For example, loan documents for the SHARE and GradSHARE loans do have signa-
ture lines for co-signers. A student, however, is not required to have a co-signer in order to
obtain an educational loan through these programs. See loan documents available on file at
the Legal Forum office.
[1991:
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This notice is not the contract that makes you liable
for the debt.24
This notice implies that co-signers are secondarily liable for the
debt, making their obligation contingent on student default. How-
ever if default occurs, the second and third paragraphs notify co-
signers that the lender has full recourse against them for any un-
paid amounts. Other co-signer provisions are less clear, but essen-
tially require co-signers to pay only if the students default.25
Section 523(a)(8) affects non-student co-signers under two dif-
ferent scenarios. In the first, students default, making the co-sign-
ers primarily liable for the educational loans. If a co-signer then
declares bankruptcy, the court must decide whether the co-signer
may discharge the debt. In the second, co-signers declare bank-
ruptcy while their obligations are still contingent. The co-signer is
not presently liable for the debt, either because the student is still
in school or because he has not defaulted on the loan. This latter
scenario, however, is merely hypothetical at present; all the cases
that have come before bankruptcy courts have involved co-signers
whose obligations have already come due.
24 This provision appears in the loan documents for Share, GradSHARE, LSL and
TLP. These loans, which students or parents may use for various educational expenses, are
backed by government guarantees. See loan documents available on file at the Legal Forum
office.
25 The following provisions are part of the SHARE and GradSHARE loan contract of-
fered by Nellie Mae:
6. DEFAULT: If I default on this loan, the Lender may declare the entire unpaid
amount of the loan, including interest, immediately due and payable without no-
tice to me. "Default" means the occurrence of any of the following events: ... my
filing or a filing against me of a petition in bankruptcy.
15. MULTIPLE BORROWERS: If this Note is executed by more than one bor-
rower, each borrower agrees that any communication between the Lender and any
one of the borrowers will be binding on all of the borrowers, and that the provi-
sions of this Note will apply to all borrowers individually and collectively.
A promissory note to obtain funds from the Supplemental Loans for Students Program
("SLS") contains the following provisions:
NOTE TO CO-SIGNER: At the lender's option, a co-signer (but not a co-maker)
may be required. In a co-signer relationship, both parties are not equally liable for
the loan. The borrower assumes primary liability and is fully responsible for re-
paying the debt. The co-signer is secondarily liable. Only in the event that the
primarily liable person fails to honor the repayment obligation will the lender at-
tempt to collect from the co-signer.
CANCELLATION: If a borrower dies or becomes totally and permanently dis-
abled, the obligation to make any further payments on the loan is discharged.
However, if the student and a co-signer obtain a loan and only one of the borrow-
ers dies, becomes totally or permanently disabled or has his/her debts discharged
in bankruptcy, the surviving borrower remains obligated to repay the loan.
See loan documents available on file at the Legal Forum office.
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 523(a)(8)
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was the first substantial
revision of the Bankruptcy Code in 40 years. The 1978 Act trans-
formed the Bankruptcy Code in two major respects. 2 First, it en-
acted statutes that reflected changes in debtor-creditor relations
and consolidated the bankruptcy statutes into Title 11.27 Second, it
restructured the bankruptcy court system, granting them indepen-
dence from district courts and relieving judges of administrative
burdens.28
Section 523(a)(8) relates to a statute passed one year earlier as
an amendment to the Higher Educational Act of 1965.29 The previ-
ous student loan discharge provision differed from section
523(a)(8) only in that it covered fewer types of loans.30 Many
House members apparently assumed the old provision would be in-
corporated into the new Bankruptcy Code.3' The House Judiciary
16 HR Rep No 95-595 at 2-3 (debtor-creditor relationships), 3-4 (judicial changes), re-
printed in 1978 USCCAN 5763, 5764-65 and 5765-66 (cited in note 5). For additional infor-
mation about the changes enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, see S Rep No 95-
989, 95th Cong, 2d Sess, 1-176, reprinted in 1978 USCCAN at 5787-5962.
27 Id.
'8 Id at 3-4. "In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
US 50 (1982), the Supreme Court struck down the jurisdictional provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on the grounds that bankruptcy judges exercised 'judicial power'
within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution and therefore had to have life tenure."
Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems, and Materials on Bankruptcy
36-37 (Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed, 1990). Subsequently, Congress passed the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 to cure the jurisdictional defects of the
1978 Act. By fragmenting the judicial power of bankruptcy courts, Congress granted bank-
ruptcy judges sufficient authority to decide some core jurisdictional issues. Id at 37.
29 HR Rep No 95-595 at 132, reprinted in 1978 USCCAN at 6093 (cited in note 5).
"During the 94th Congress, the Education and Labor Committee proposed ... to [add] a
new section 439(A) to the Higher Education Act of 1965 to make loans guaranteed or in-
sured under that Act nondischargeable in bankruptcy for a period of five years after the
loan first becomes due, unless payment from future income would impose an undue hard-
ship on the debtor." Id.
At the same time, a similar provision was enacted to except loans under the health
professions law to except educational loans from bankruptcy for a five year period. Id. This
provision, although subsequently amended, permits discharge of an educational loan debt
only "after the expiration of a five year period. . . when repayment of such loan is required;
[and] upon a finding by the Bankruptcy Court that the nondischarge of such debt would be
unconscionable." 42 USCA § 294f(g)(1-2).
8o Bankruptcy Reform Act, 95th Cong, 2d Sess (1977) in 124 Cong Rec 1791, 1792 (re-
marks of Rep. Dodd), 1793-94 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn), 1795 (remarks of Rep. Michel
and Rep. Ford) (Feb 1, 1978).
41 124 Cong Rec 1791, 1792 (remarks of Rep. Dodd), 1795 (remarks of Rep. Ford) (Feb
1, 1978). Both of these Representatives opposed the Ertel amendment and contended that
the amendment to the Higher Education Act of 1965 became law automatically since Con-
gress failed to deal directly with the issue.
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Committee, however, did not adopt the old provision. 2 Relying on
General Accounting Office reports, 3 the committee concluded that
the real problem was the high default rate on student loans, a
problem not effectively addressed by a bankruptcy discharge
provision.
Consequently, Representative Allan E. Ertel (D-Pa) intro-
duced section 523(a)(8) as a floor amendment to the revised
Code. 4 Although aware that a provision excepting educational
loans from discharge in bankruptcy proceedings would frustrate
the "fresh start" policy, Ertel argued that this provision was none-
theless necessary to insure funds for future students. 5 Because
these programs rely on graduate repayment to provide funds for
future students,36 Ertel suggested that this provision was necessary
to curtail the abuse3 7 of the bankruptcy process and to insure the
continued availability of loan funds. Student borrowers needed
this deterrent, Ertel argued, because they did not put up any col-
lateral and in general did not have the same incentive as other bor-
rowers to meet their financial obligations.3 8 Compared to other
borrowers, students had much less to lose by filing bankruptcy.
Both proponents and opponents of the amendment used sta-
tistics to support their respective positions. Ertel and others ar-
gued that bankruptcies by student debtors were, according to the
following data, on the rise:
During the 1965-72 period, the amount of student loan
bankruptcies totaled $2.4 million nationally, or $300,000
per year. From 1972 to February 1975, the national value
of the bankruptcies totaled $11.3 or $3.7 million per year.
This is a 1,200 percent increase.39
Ertel's opponents, however, offered a more persuasive argu-
ment: student bankruptcies were not a major problem; the real
threat to educational loan funds was student borrowers who simply
HR Rep No 95-595 at 133 (cited in note 5).
88 Id at 134-38. The GAO apparently conducted a study of former students who de-
clared bankruptcy to discharge their debts and concluded that the real problem facing the
student loan program was the rate of student defaults.
" H 8200, 95th Cong, 2d Sess (Feb 1, 1978) in 124 Cong Rec 1783, 1791 (Feb 1, 1978).
35 Id at 1791-92.
" Id at 1792.
', Graduates who declare bankruptcy in order to discharge their debts which consist
primarily of student loans abuse the bankruptcy process. Id.
" 124 Cong Rec at 1792. See also id at 1793 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn).
3' Id at 1792 (remarks of Rep. Mottl).
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refused to repay their loans.4 0 Representative William Ford (D-Mi)
claimed that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
which administered the program, had failed to collect the loans
properly. 41 Representative Christopher Dodd (D-Ct) cited statistics
from the Office of Education to show that only five percent of
losses incurred were caused by bankruptcies, while 90 to 92 percent
of the losses resulted from defaults.42 Essentially, Dodd argued
that since the underlying problem was caused by defaults and ad-
ministrative deficiencies, not bankruptcy filings, the proposed dis-
charge exception was an unjustifiable intrusion on the "fresh start"
policy.43
Despite opposition, the House amendment passed" and was
enacted in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.45 Neither the ini-
tial legislation nor subsequent amendments have revealed how this
exception affects co-signers of educational loans; the only legisla-
tive references to co-signers appeared in the House Report, stating
that educational loans are made without co-signers.4 6 Thus, courts
receive no specific guidance from' either the statute or accompany-
ing legislative material.
III. CASES APPLYING SECTION 523(a)(8) TO NON-STUDENT
CO-SIGNERS
Courts differ in their analysis of the applicability of the stu-
dent loan discharge exception to non-student co-signers. The first
bankruptcy courts to address the issue reasoned that Congress in-
tended section 523(a)(8) to apply only to students; these courts
therefore permitted non-students to discharge their obligations.
More recently, however, courts have construed the statute strictly,
refusing discharge to all debtors with educational loan obligations.
0 Id. For example, Representative Dodd cited a congressionally commissioned GAO
study that determined the losses incurred when former students defaulted on their educa-
tion loans. Dodd asserted that the study showed that "the problem is with defaults, and
there is a distinction between defaults and bankruptcies." Id.
Id at 1796.
124 Cong Rec at 1796.
43 For example, Representative Dodd contended that "to suggest that we are going to
somehow alleviate a problem that may exist in defaults by accepting an amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act is just a misconception." Id at 1793. He continued his argument, noting
that this amendment directly frustrates the "fresh start" policy for students.
4 Id at 1798.
41 CIS Index for 1978, vol 9, no 12 at 1219.
" HR Rep No 95-595 at 136 (cited in note 5).
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The first reported case to address the issue was In re Boylen.47
In this case, the debtor co-signed a $1,200 student loan for his for-
mer wife and sought to discharge the loan in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The court held "that Congress had no intention to except a
co-[signer]'s liability on a student loan debt from discharge. '" '
Further, the court noted that "[t]he language of a statute must be
given its plain meaning unless the intent of the legislature or the
purposes served by the statute would be frustrated by such an in-
terpretation."4 Acknowledging that the statutory language of sec-
tion 523(a)(8) was straightforward, the court relied instead on the
legislative history as proof that Congress intended the section to
prevent only students from discharging their educational debts.50
Thus, the court concluded that the debtor was "a far cry from the
debtor about whom this exception to discharge was drafted.""1
The court justified its result with three largely unrelated argu-
ments. First, it held that section 523(a)(8) applied only to student
borrowers, and that applying it 'to non-student co-signers would
frustrate the Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start" policy.5 2 Second,
even if section 523(a)(8) could apply to non-students, it did not in
this particular case, because the debtor derived no significant ben-
efit from his former wife's education."3 Third, the court held that
even if it was wrong with respect to the preceding arguments, the
debt should be discharged under the statute's "undue hardship"
exemption."
The next case to address the question relied heavily on the
analysis in Boylen. In In re Washington, the court discharged the
obligation of two Virginia parents who co-signed their daughter's
student loan, noting that the two did not benefit from their child's
education. 5 Subsequent cases have relied heavily on Boylen and
Washington without doing much further analysis of their own. 6
,1 29 Bankr 924 (N D Ohio 1983).
48 Id at 927.
" Id at 926, citing Roth Steel Products.v Sharon Steel, 705 F2d 134, 152 (6th Cir
1983).
80 Id.
51 In re Boylen, 29 Bankr at 926.
52 Id.
53 Id.
4 Id at 927.
55 41 Bankr 214 (E D Va 1984).
" In another case, a bankruptcy court permitted a parent who co-signed her child's
educational loan to discharge the debt, holding that it was not an "educational loan" since
the debtor was not a student borrower. In re Bawden, 55 Bankr 459, 461-62 (M D Ala 1985).
The loan in this case was made by First Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association.
The "loan was made under the Alabama Guaranteed Student Loan Program and assigned to
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These courts allow discharge on the theory that the statute does
not apply to non-students, or that these particular non-students
did not benefit from the educational loan, or both.
Other courts, however, apply the plain-language approach re-
jected in Boylen and Washington, holding that section 523(a)(8)
plainly prohibits the discharge of all educational loan obligations
absent a showing of "undue hardship." In short, the statute applies
regardless of who owes the money.
This rationale was first applied in In re Feenstra, where only
the parent, not the student, signed the note for an educational
loan. 7 In this case, the parents signed for a loan that paid their
son's college tuition and then declared bankruptcy, seeking to dis-
charge their debts, including the educational loan." The Feenstra
court held that section 523(a)(8) excepted all government funded
educational loans from bankruptcy discharge, even those taken out
by parents. 9 Thus, the court concluded that "an educational loan
guaranteed by a governmental unit or non-profit institution re-
gardless of whether the loan is made directly to the student or to
the student's parent," is not dischargeable under this provision.6
However, the court did find "undue hardship"-the co-signer's
family included five recovering alcoholics-and ultimately relieved
the parents of their obligation."1
the Alabama Commission on Higher Education, who is the guarantor." Id at 460. In addi-
tion to specifically adopting the holdings of Boylen and Washington, the court focused on
whether the debtor was a student. The court held that if the debtor is not a student, the
loan is not an educational loan, and may be discharged since § 523(a)(8) does not apply.
A bankruptcy court in Iowa summarily stated that § 523(a)(8) did not apply to a spouse
who co-signed his wife's student loan, and discharged the student's debt for undue hardship.
In re Zobel, 80 Bankr 950 (N D Iowa 1986).
Similarly, a Wisconsin court discharged a guaranteed educational loan for a debtor who
co-signed her spouse's student loan. In re Meier, 85 Bankr 805, 806 (W D Wis 1986). The
Wisconsin Higher Education Corporation ("WHEC") made the $2,500 loan to Mr. Meier as
the "maker," and the debtor signed as the "endorser." When Mr. Meier defaulted on the
loan, WHEC sought to collect from the debtor. Id.
Using the Washington rationale, another court determined that parents who co-signed
their child's student loan did not benefit from the loan, and discharged the loan. In re Behr,
80 Bankr 124 (N D Iowa 1987). Northwestern University Student Loan Office made the
$7,680 loan to the debtor as a "co-maker" for his son. Id at 124.
57 In re Feenatra, 51 Bankr 107, 108 (W D NY 1985). The debtor obtained the educa-
tional loan from Monroe Savings Bank. Id. The New York State Higher Education Services
Corporation guaranteed the loan, and purchased the loan from the bank when the debtor
defaulted. The proceeds of the loan were paid directly to the University of Rochester, which
the debtor's son attended.
5 Id.
59 Id at 110.
60 Id at 111.
I" In re Feenstra, 51 Bankr at 112-13.
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Although the Feenstra case was not a co-signer case, it is anal-
ogous to the situation in which a non-student co-signs a loan taken
out by a student. Moreover, the Feenstra court's interpretation of
the discharge provision has influenced the cases that prohibit co-
signer discharge. 2
The first reported case to apply Feenstra to a non-student co-
signer was Matter of Barth.6a In this case, the court refused dis-
charge to a non-student who had co-signed her son's educational
loan.64 The court declared that any loan which was "made, insured,
or guaranteed by a governmental unit" for educational purposes
was an educational loan." The court rejected the Washington
"benefits" test, holding that it was irrelevant to section 523(a)(8)
whether the co-signer had benefitted from the education financed
by the loan.6 Additionally, the court found that nothing in the leg-
islative history of section 523(a)(8) expressed a clear intent to ex-
empt co-signers. 7 In the absence of such intent, the court refused
to discharge the co-signer's obligation. The only other non-student
co-signer case since Barth has followed its reasoning.6
" Not surprisingly, Feenstra has also influenced similar cases where parents were the
primary obligors. In In re Reid, the court held that the PLUS loan could not be discharged
under § 523(a)(8) because the parent failed to prove that the loan imposed undue hardship
on the family. 39 Bankr 24 (E D Tenn 1984). First Tennessee Bank of Knoxville made the
PLUS loan to the debtor, and the Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation guaranteed
the debt. Id.
Similarly, another court concluded that an educational loan signed only by a parent was
not dischargeable. In re Hammarstrom, 95 Bankr 160 (N D Cal 1989). The SHARE loan
was made by Bay Bank Boston, and the note was immediately purchased by Nellie Mae
pursuant to a prior agreement. The Education Resources Institute guaranteed repayment of
the loan.
In In re Hudak, the court rejected the parent's motion for summary judgment that
contended that the discharge prohibition did not extend to PLUS loans. 113 Bankr 923 (W
D Pa 1990).
' 86 Bankr 146 (W D Wis 1988).
Id. The student obtained a loan from the Bank of Waunakee, "which the debtor
signed as an endorser." Id at 147. When collection proceedings became necessary, the bank
assigned the loan to the Wisconsin Higher Education Corporation.
65 Id at 148.
"Id.
0" Matter of Barth, 86 Bankr at 149.
" A bankruptcy court in Georgia held that § 523(a)(8) makes educational loans non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy, even for parents who co-signed student loans. Matter of
Selmonosky, 93 Bankr 785, 787 (N D Ga 1988). First National Bank of Boston loaned
$15,000 to the student and the parents co-signed this loan. South Shore Bank made a
$46,875 loan to the debtors, but it was unclear whether parents co-signed the loan with the
student or signed the loan themselves. TERI guaranteed both of these loans, and Nellie Mae
provided a guarantee for the South Shore loan. Id at 785-86.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 523(a)(8)
A number of courts have relied extensively on the legislative
history of section 523(a)(8) to hold that the statute does not apply
to co-signers. These courts hold that Congress's sole intent was to
prevent students from using the bankruptcy laws to renege on
their obligations. Thus, section 523(a)(8) should not apply to non-
student co-signers. Accordingly, courts ought to permit all non-stu
dent co-signers to discharge these loans pursuant to the "fresh
start" policy.
Admittedly, this approach is subject to reasonable criticism.
The legislative history is not instructive on this specific issue be-
cause Congress did not contemplate the effects this provision
would have on co-signer rights.6 9 As courts have noted, the only
reference to co-signers is a brief observation in the House Report
that student loans generally did not require them.70 The floor de-
bate included no mention of co-signers at all.71 And during the
twelve years this statute has been in effect, Congress has revised
the exception, but has never addressed the issue of whether section
523(a)(8) applies to co-signers.
Another compelling criticism is that courts should not go be-
yond the text of the statute where, as in this case, the language is
unambiguous. Section 523(a)(8) is clear: any money obtained from
a student loan program is an "educational loan," regardless of how
the money is used or who obtains the loan. Influential proponents
of this approach argue that when the text of the legislation is clear,
"there is no justification for resort to the legislative history. '72 At
least one court has embraced this "plain meaning" approach in ap-
plying section 523(a)(8) to a co-signer.73
Additionally, the Supreme Court has advocated interpreting
bankruptcy statutes according to their "plain meaning. '74 "The
plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the
" HR Rep No 95-595 at 133 (cited in note 5).
70 Id at 136.
124 Cong Rec at 1791-98 (cited in note 30).
71 Justice Scalia has been the most high-profile proponent of this view. See his concur-
ring opinions in United States v Taylor, 487 US 326, 344 (1988); Green v Bock Laundry
Machine Co., 109 S Ct 1981, 1994-95 (1989). See also, Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Do-
mains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533 (1983).
7' Matter of Barth, 86 Bankr at 149.
7' Kelly v Robinson, 479 US 36, 43 (1986), quoting United States v Heirs of Boisdore, 8
How 113, 122 (1849). The court in Kelly precedes this phrase with the statement: "In ex-
pounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence but
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its objective and policy." This cannon of
interpretation is followed by this Comment. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will pro-
duce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its draft-
ers.' "" Thus, courts declining discharge to non-student co-signers
may refer to the first point above-that this result cannot be "de-
monstrably at odds with the intention of the drafters" because the
subject of how to treat these obligations never arose. These courts
can also note that declining discharge in these instances is entirely
consistent with the legislative goal of preserving loan funds.76
Moreover, one of the key arguments made by courts favoring
discharge-that co-signers received no "benefit" from the
loan-has no basis in either the statute or logic. Nothing in the
text or the legislative history'suggests this approach. Nor is it con-
ceivable that a co-signer would incur the obligation without receiv-
ing some benefit, psychic or otherwise: A parent may benefit from
knowing his child attends an excellent educational institution, and
a spouse may see real economic gain from his wife's professional
education.
Although criticism of the "benefits" analysis is certainly cor-
rect, the overall argument that co-signer discharge should be pro-
hibited is too simplistic. The legislative history does reveal a spe-
cific purpose for section 523(a)(8): to protect the pool of
educational loan funds with the least possible intrusion on the
"fresh start" policy.77 The "fresh start" policy underlies the entire
Bankruptcy Code, and the philosophy behind this policy is that
discharge permits "an individual's human capital (as manifested in
future earnings), as well as his future inheritances and gifts," to be
free of "liabilities [ ] incurred in the past."78 By allowing discharge,
the Code releases debtors from prior financial obligations and at-
tempts to prevent the negative consequences that might otherwise
follow from a declaration of bankruptcy.79
Limiting the discharge exception to students only is most con-
sistent with the "fresh start" policy. As members of Congress
noted, without section 523(a)(8), student debtors-whose debts
come almost entirely from educational loans-might see the Bank-
ruptcy Code as an attractive and comparatively painless means by
which to eliminate their obligations."0 That this exception is an ac-
7 United States v Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc, 489 US 235, 242 (1989), citing Griffin v
Oceanic Contractors, Inc, 458 US 564, 571 (1982).
" See notes 35-36 and accompanying text. . 7 .
" 11 USC §§ 101 et seq (1979 and 1991 Supp).
'8 Jackson, 98 Harv L Rev at 1396 (cited in note 10).
' Id at 1393. See note 10 and accompanying text.
*o See note 38 and accompanying text.
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ceptable intrusion on the "fresh start" policy is a decision Congress
unquestionably made.
Extending section 523(a)(8) to non-student co-signers does not
return the same benefits. Co-signers do not have the same incen-
tive to declare bankruptcy that recent graduates do. Their finan-
cial relations-mortgages, car loans, credit cards-are presumably
more established; an established credit history is what makes them
attractive as co-signers in the first place. That they would "abuse"
the bankruptcy process in the way envisioned by Congress is at
best improbable.
Moreover, co-signer discharge will have little effect on the pool
of educational loan funds. Only nine co-signer cases have been ad-
judicated since 1983; the average amount discharged in each case
was $10,915, a total of $98,240. By comparison, taxpayers spent
more that $2 billion in 1990 covering government loan guarantees
for student borrowers who defaulted but did not file for bank-
ruptcy."' While predicting the amounts future co-signers might
discharge is difficult, these cases suggest that co-signer discharges
affect educational loan funds only minimally. If nothing else, these
figures support allowing discharge for co-signers whose obligations
remain contingent, should such a case ever go to court. Interest-
ingly, courts that permit co-signer discharge have not made this
point.
Also, no evidence indicates that lenders have reacted nega-
tively in those jurisdictions that exempt non-student co-signers
from section 523(a)(8). In those jurisdictions that discharge non-
student co-signers, lenders might react by making loans available
on less favorable terms or by limiting the number of loans of-
fered-both of which would be adverse to the general goals of stu-
dent loan programs. However, lenders have not responded to co-
signer discharge in this manner, nor does it appear likely that they
will, given the fact that the marginal risk these loans present has
increased only slightly. The number of cases in which co-signers
declare bankruptcy is simply not significant enough to alter lender
behavior.
Making section 523(a)(8) inapplicable to non-student co-sign-
ers would also eliminate inconsistent judicial treatment of the stat-
ute's "undue hardship" exemption.82 Four of the eight section
523(a)(8) co-signer cases have considered whether the co-signer
" See note 18 and accompanying text.




qualified for relief under this standard. Only one of these courts
refused to grant an "undue hardship" discharge.88 The remaining
three held that non-student co-signers were exempt from section
523(a)(8), and that even if they were not, they would qualify for
discharge under the "undue hardship" standard.84 Thus, if section
523(a)(8) were read to include co-signers, fact-specific "undue
hardship" analysis would nevertheless relieve some debtors of their
obligations. As a result, inconsistency in these cases is perhaps to
be expected, as it has surfaced in dozens of similar cases involving
student borrowers.8 5
Permitting non-student co-signers to discharge their obliga-
tions does not mean that parents who obtain loans to defray the
expense of educating their child should be exempt from section
523(a)(8). Some loans that qualify as educational loans under the
statute are available to parents.86 In these cases section 523(a)(8)
should apply, because the parent undoubtedly realizes that he, and
not his child, will be responsible for the debt. Moreover, these
cases do involve the potential for abuse of the bankruptcy process
that prompted Congress to create the discharge exception.
CONCLUSION
Congress created section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code to
insure that student borrowers would not renege on their loans by
filing for bankruptcy shortly after graduation. Since this provision
was enacted in 1978, student loan practice has changed considera-
bly. Many educational lenders now require students to find a co-
signer before they will make an educational loan. Section
523(a)(8)'s silence on how co-signer obligations should be treated,
(1) the mechanical test (focusing on the debtor's expenses and future financial
resources);
(2) the good faith test (factors include debtor's efforts to obtain employment, min-
imize expenditures, and maximize resources); and
(3) the underlying policy test (amount of student loan debt, percentage of indebt-
edness, and benefit from education).
In re Feenstra, 51 Bankr 107, 112 (W D NY 1985), citing In re Clay, 12 Bankr 251, 254 (N
D Iowa 1981) and In re Johnson, 5 BCD 532, 544-45 (E D Pa 1979).
88 In re Reid, 39 Bankr 24 (E D Tenn 1984) (denied discharge). In contrast, a court that
applied § 523(a)(8) to a parent who signed the educational. loan did permit discharge for
reasons of "undue hardship" on the debtor and his family. In re Feenstra, 51 Bankr at 107.
" In re Boylen, 29 Bankr 924 (N D Ohio 1983); In re Washington, 41 Bankr 211 (E D
Va 1984); In re Zobel, 80 Bankr 950 (N D Iowa 1986).
85 Janice E. Kosel, Running the Gauntlet of "Undue Hardship"-The Discharge of
Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 11 Golden Gate L Rev 457 (1981).
" See notes 15-20, 60 and accompanying text. This issue was the essential question the
court addressed in In re Feentra, 51 Bankr at 107.
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and Congress's continued failure to address the issue, have left the
issue to the courts. The few that have considered the question have
reached different results.
Allowing non-student co-signers to discharge their obliga-
tions-the result favored by most courts that have considered the
issue-is the best approach. This result is most consistent with the
goal of protecting the pool of educational funds with the least in-
trusion possible on the "fresh start" policy that animates the
Bankruptcy Code.
